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Abstract
The European Monetary Union (EMU) has removed crucial instruments of macro-
economic management from the control of democratically accountable governments. 
Worse still, the EMU has systemically caused destabilizing macroeconomic imbalances 
that member states found difficult or impossible to counteract with their remaining 
policy instruments. And even though the international financial crisis had its origins 
beyond Europe, the EMU has greatly increased the vulnerability of some member states 
to its repercussions. Its effects have undermined the economic and fiscal viability of 
some EMU member states and have frustrated political demands and expectations to 
an extent that may yet transform the economic crisis into a crisis of democratic legiti-
macy. Moreover, present efforts by EMU governments to “rescue the euro” will do little 
to correct the economic imbalances and vulnerabilities, but are likely to deepen eco-
nomic problems and political alienation in both the rescued and the rescuing polities. 
Zusammenfassung
Die Europäische Währungsunion hat ihren Mitgliedstaaten die wesentlichen Instru-
mente der makroökonomischen Politik entzogen. Zugleich ist die einheitliche europä-
ische Geldpolitik die strukturelle Ursache makroökonomischer Ungleichgewichte, die 
die Mitgliedstaaten mit den verbliebenen Mitteln nicht ausgleichen können. Und ob-
wohl die internationale Finanzkrise nicht von Europa ausging, hat die Währungsunion 
die Verwundbarkeit einiger Mitgliedstaaten für deren Auswirkungen beträchtlich ge-
steigert. Die Folgen für die Wirtschaft der betroffenen Länder sind verheerend, und je 
mehr deren Politik gezwungen wird, die Forderungen und Erwartungen ihrer Bürger 
zu enttäuschen, desto eher kann die ökonomische Krise auch die demokratische Legiti-
mität zerstören. Überdies ignorieren die gegenwärtigen Maßnahmen zur „Rettung des 
Euro“ die strukturellen Ursachen der ökonomischen Ungleichgewichte, und sie wer-
den deshalb eher zur Verschärfung der ökonomischen Probleme und der politischen 
Frustra tion in den Geber- wie in den Nehmerländern beitragen.
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Monetary Union, Fiscal Crisis  
and the Preemption of Democracy
1 Introduction
In capitalist democracies, governments depend on the confidence of their voters. But to 
maintain this confidence they also depend on the performance of their real economies 
and, increasingly, on the confidence of financial markets. To meet these requirements 
at the same time is difficult even under the best circumstances. At the end of the long 
period of postwar economic growth, however, theorists of normative political economy 
postulated the existence of a systemic contradiction between the state’s need to ensure 
democratic legitimacy by responding to citizens’ demands for public services and redis-
tribution, and the functional requirements of ensuring the continuing profitability of a 
capitalist economy. Depending on their position on the left-right spectrum of norma-
tive orientations, these authors interpreted the expected clash as either a “legitimacy 
crisis” or as a “governability crisis” of democratic capitalism (e.g., Offe 1972; Habermas 
1973; Hennis et al. 1978; Schäfer 2009; Klenk/Nullmeier 2010). 
In the following decades, however, neither of these expectations was confirmed. Instead, 
voters in capitalist democracies seemed to have realized that their well-being depended 
as much on the performance of the capitalist economy as on the public goods, services 
and transfers provided by the democratic state. Governments were of course held po-
litically accountable for the performance of the public sector and its balance of benefits 
and compulsory contributions. But they were held equally accountable for managing 
the capitalist economy and ensuring its continuing provision of jobs, incomes and con-
sumer goods. In effect, the capitalist economy’s performance rather than its transfor-
mation seems to have become a crucial argument of democratic legitimacy.
This presupposes, however, that democratically accountable governments have the ca-
pacity to shape the course of their economies. But compared to the situation in the 
early 1970s, the progressive internationalization of economic interactions has greatly 
increased the difficulties of successful economic management. At that time, liberaliza-
tion had been largely confined to product markets. National economic policy needed to 
ensure international competitiveness under a balance-of-payments constraint – but it 
was free in the choice of production regimes and in the macroeconomic management 
of the domestic economy. With the increasing integration of capital markets, however, 
international capital flows became decoupled from transactions in product markets, 
and financial inter-penetration made national economies vulnerable to crises originat-
ing elsewhere. At the same time, international and, even more so, European rules on 
product and capital market liberalization imposed legal constraints that eliminated 
many policy options on which governments had previously relied to manage national 
2 MPIfG Discussion Paper 11/11
economies. Compared to the period before the 1970s, successful economic manage-
ment has therefore become much harder.
In the present essay I focus on the European Monetary Union (EMU), which has re-
moved crucial instruments of macroeconomic management from the control of demo-
cratically accountable governments. Worse yet, the EMU has been the systemic cause 
of destabilizing macroeconomic imbalances that member states find difficult or im-
possible to counteract with their remaining policy instruments. And even though the 
international financial crisis had its origins beyond Europe, the Monetary Union has 
greatly increased the vulnerability of some member states to its repercussions. Its effects 
have undermined the economic and fiscal viability of some EMU member states, and 
have frustrated political demands and expectations to an extent that may yet transform 
the economic crisis into a crisis of democratic legitimacy. Moreover, present efforts of 
EMU governments to “rescue the euro” will do little to correct economic imbalances 
and vulnerabilities, but are likely to deepen economic problems and political alienation 
in both the rescued and the rescuing polities. 
The paper begins with a brief reflection on the problematic relationship between demo-
cratic legitimacy and macroeconomic management, followed by an equally brief restate-
ment of the essential elements of Keynesian and monetarist policy models and their 
specific political implications. I then try to show how existing national regimes have 
been transformed by the creation of the European Monetary Union, and how the desta-
bilizing dynamics of the European monetary policy have left some EMU member states 
dangerously vulnerable at the onset of the international financial crisis. In the conclud-
ing section, I examine the likely politico-economic and political consequences of pro-
grams intended to rescue the euro and to reform the regime of the monetary union.
2 Democratic legitimacy and macroeconomic management
After the Great Depression of the 1930s and World War II, governments in Western 
democracies rejected “socialist” programs of centralized economic planning but never-
theless assumed political responsibility for preventing the return of similar economic 
catastrophes. This was to be achieved through “macroeconomic” policies that would 
allow the state to increase or reduce aggregate economic demand in order to dampen 
the ups and downs of economic cycles, to prevent the rise of unemployment or infla-
tion, and to ensure steady economic growth. The belief that macroeconomic manage-
ment could in fact realize these goals originated in the crisis of the 1930s. It was largely 
confirmed in the “Keynesian” decades after the War, and it survived the “monetarist” 
counter revolution of the 1980s at least in the sense that economic crises continued to 
be seen as consequences of macroeconomic mismanagement. But the very possibility 
of effective control does then create an internal dilemma of democratic legitimacy – or, 
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more precisely, a potential conflict between the input-oriented and the output-oriented 
dimensions of democratic legitimacy (Scharpf 1999: ch. 1).1 
Governments are supposed to carry out the “will of the people” and they are also sup-
posed to serve the “common good.” In the input dimension, therefore, governors may 
be held accountable for policy choices that are in conflict with the politically salient 
preferences of their constituents, whereas in the output dimension, they may be sanc-
tioned if outcomes that may be attributed to government policy are seen to violate the 
politically salient concerns of the governed.2 In both dimensions, what is initially at 
stake is political support for the government of the day. But if it appears that elections 
and changes of government cannot make a difference, the democratic legitimacy of the 
political regime itself may be undermined. 
With regard to macroeconomic management, the outcomes that potentially have very 
high political salience are rising mass unemployment and accelerating rates of inflation. 
Since these are not the direct object of policy choices, however, discussions of input 
legitimacy must focus on the policy instruments that may be employed to affect out-
comes indirectly. In macroeconomic economic theory, these include choices in mon-
etary policy, fiscal policy, incomes policy and exchange-rate policy – all of which are 
assumed to have a direct effect on aggregate economic demand and hence on economic 
growth, inflation and employment. They differ greatly, however, in their political sa-
lience and, hence, in their potential relevance for input-oriented democratic legitimacy. 
Under normal conditions, monetary policy has relatively low salience in the electoral 
arena. It is seen to involve highly technical decisions that are best left to specialists in 
central banks and other agencies with an expertise in analyzing and manipulating mac-
roeconomic aggregates. Ultimately, of course, these aggregates will also affect individu-
als and firms, and they may have massive distributional consequences. But these are 
not immediately visible, and when they occur, they are not obviously related to specific 
policy choices. The same is true of policies affecting the exchange rate. Fiscal-policy, by 
contrast, while also aiming at the public-sector deficit as an aggregate variable, must be 
implemented through disaggregated taxing and spending decisions that have a direct 
1 The distinction between input- and output-oriented dimensions of democratic legitimacy uses 
the vocabulary of political systems theory (Easton 1965), but has its roots in a much older 
tradition of normative political theory that struggles with the basic tension of having to treat 
governors, at the same time, as agents and as trustees of the people (Scharpf 1970). 
2 Salience is a highly contingent and selective attribute of policy issues or outcome conditions 
that may affect the outcome of elections or incite citizens to engage in political action. And 
whereas accountability for policy choices can be clearly targeted at a particular government, ac-
countability for outcomes implies a distinction between events and conditions that are thought 
to be under the potential control of “government,” and others which are ascribed to an “act of 
god.” In multi-level polities, moreover, it is often unclear which level of government is causally 
responsible for which outcomes. But since voters are not obliged to be fair, they will tend to 
hold those governments accountable over which they happen to have electoral control – which 
in Europe is true of national governments, rather than European governing institutions.
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impact on the incomes of individuals and firms. And the same would be true if govern-
ments should (as they tried to do in some countries in the 1970s) adopt incomes poli-
cies that impose direct wage controls. 
Unlike monetary policy, therefore, choices of fiscal and incomes policy are liable to be-
come politicized. If they should violate the politically salient ex-ante preferences of con-
stituencies, they may reduce the electoral support of governments and, in the extreme 
case, undermine input legitimacy regardless of their functional necessity for achieving 
acceptable macroeconomic outcomes. In other words, macroeconomic management 
creates the possibility for a democratic dilemma: By attempting to maintain output legit-
imacy through functionally effective policy choices, governments may undermine their 
input legitimacy − and vice versa. In actual practice, however, the intensity of the dilem-
ma depends not only on the type of economic challenges but also on the choice between 
the Keynesian or monetarist models or paradigms of macroeconomic management. 
Keynesian problems and the Bundesbank’s monetarist social compact
The Keynesian model assigns the leading function to fiscal policy. In a recession, it is 
supposed to expand aggregate demand through tax cuts and deficit-financed expen-
ditures; and when the economy is overheating, demand should be reduced through 
tax increases and spending cuts. Monetary policy is supposed to be “accommodating” 
– that is to finance fiscal expansion at low interest rates and to avoid a collapse of do-
mestic demand during fiscal retrenchment. Having been conceived in response to the 
Great Depression of the 1930s, the overriding goal of the Keynesian paradigm was to 
maintain full employment. In the US and the UK it worked reasonably well in combat-
ing recessions during the early postwar decades. Even then, however, it was obvious that 
fiscal retrenchment was politically much more difficult to implement than fiscal expan-
sion – which implied continuous inflationary pressures and a steady accumulation of 
public-sector debt. 
Moreover, the British experience demonstrated that – under conditions of an industri-
al-relations system with powerful and competitive unions – an effective incomes policy 
should have been a necessary complement to fiscal Keynesianism. Without it, expan-
sionary fiscal impulses were quickly consumed by wage increases. Because statutory 
wage controls did not seem to work, governments tried to contain wage-push inflation 
through stop-go policies that never allowed steady economic growth to take off. In the 
“stagflation” period of the 1970s, when the oil price crisis combined the challenges of 
demand-deficient unemployment and cost-push inflation, the Keynesian model finally 
failed almost everywhere. Fiscal expansion would have accelerated inflation, and fiscal 
retrenchment would have driven up mass unemployment – and in fact most countries 
ended up with both. In a few countries, however, economically sophisticated and orga-
nizationally powerful and centralized unions were able to contain cost-push inflation 
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through effective wage restraint, allowing fiscal and monetary reflation to prevent the 
rise of mass unemployment (Scharpf 1991).
The monetarist paradigm, which has its theoretical roots in pre-Keynesian neoclassical 
economics (Johnson 1971), owed its practical appeal to the collapse of Keynesian poli-
cies in the 1970s. From a political-science perspective, however, its greatest comparative 
advantage was its lesser dependence on politically salient policy choices. Abandoning 
the political commitment to full employment, the monetarist paradigm assigned the 
leading role to the monetary policy of an independent central bank, whose paramount 
function is to maintain price stability. Beyond that, it ensures a steady money supply 
sufficient to allow non-inflationary economic growth. Whether this could be realized 
in practice then depended entirely on the willingness of governments and unions to 
adjust their claims on the total economic product to the monetary corridor defined by 
the central bank. 
The German Bundesbank was the first to establish a monetarist regime in the early 
1970s. After having dramatically demonstrated the destructive potential of monetary 
retrenchment in the crisis of 1973/4, the Bank did in fact confront the government and 
the unions with the offer of an implicit “social compact” (Scharpf 1991: 128–139). It 
took great pains to explain to the government, unions, and public, how coordination by 
monetary policy would not only ensure price stability but also produce economically 
superior and politically justifiable macroeconomic outcomes. Once rampant inflation 
was brought under control, it would precisely monitor the state of the German econ-
omy and pre-announce annual monetary targets by reference to the current “output 
gap.” Maximum non-inflationary growth would then be achieved if fiscal policy merely 
allowed the “automatic stabilizers” to rise and fall over the business cycle, and if wages 
rose with labor productivity. Thus fiscal policy would be relieved of its heroic Keynesian 
role, and unions would no longer be pressured to enact a countercyclical incomes policy. 
In other words, responsibility for the management of the economy would be assumed 
by the “non-political” monetary policy of the independent Bank, whereas non-infla-
tionary fiscal and wage policies could be conducted with a low political profile. And 
as governments and unions did learn to play by the Bank’s new rules, the monetarist 
regime did in fact work reasonably well, economically and politically, for Germany.3
3 This is a stylized account that does not apply to conflicts in 1991–92 when the Bank drastically 
(and from its perspective, successfully) intervened against rising public-sector deficits in the 
wake of German unification.
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3 From monetarism in one country to Monetary Union
Originally, monetarist as well as Keynesian models had been designed for national 
economies which were exposed to international competition in product markets, but 
retained control over their monetary regimes. For both, therefore, increasing capital 
mobility would raise difficulties. Keynesian reflation would become prohibitively ex-
pensive if the central bank was no longer able to maintain low interest rates; and mon-
etary policy could not be targeted to the “output gap” of the national economy if inter-
est rates were determined by the fluctuations of international capital markets. This be-
came obvious in the early 1980s, when German recovery was crushed as the Bundesbank 
found it necessary to follow the dramatic increase of American interest rates, or when 
fiscal reflation in France had to be aborted under the pressure of massive capital flights. 
At the same time, capital mobility had also increased the volatility of exchange rates, 
which was seen as a major problem for exporters in integrated product markets. There 
were several reasons, therefore, for European governments4 to be interested in creating 
a common European monetary regime. 
The first such attempt, the European “Snake in the Tunnel” of 1972, had quickly disin-
tegrated in the oil-price crisis. Subsequently, the “European Monetary System” (EMS) 
of 1979 committed its member states to peg their currencies to a currency basket (the 
“ECU”). But since Germany was the biggest economy and the most important trading 
partner for most other member states, the EMS meant in fact that their currencies were 
pegged to the Deutschmark – which also implied that in order stay within the agreed-
upon bandwidth, their central banks needed to mirror the stability-oriented monetary 
policy of the Bundesbank. For the other member states, this turned out to be difficult 
for several reasons.
First, German monetary policy continued to be precisely targeted to German conditions 
which could differ from those of the other member economies. Hence when, in 1992, 
the Bank decided to punish Helmut Kohl for the deficit-financing of German unifica-
tion, other economies suffered as well − and the UK and Sweden (that had only recently 
joined the EMS) were catapulted out of the Monetary System by currency speculation. 
Moreover, governments and unions that had not gone through the harrowing German 
experiences of 1973–75 and 1981–82 did not necessarily appreciate the awesome power 
of monetary constraints. Nor had their central banks a background of institutional 
autonomy, experience and credibility that would have allowed them to intervene with 
equal authority against public-sector deficits and wage settlements that diverged from 
the path defined for Germany. 
4 It should be noted, however, that the initiatives were coming from Germany. With the breakup 
of the Bretton-Woods regime, German producers had lost the protection of an undervalued 
currency, and currency fluctuations were particularly unfavorable for export-oriented invest-
ment-goods branches operating with high fixed costs.
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Even more important, however, were the institutional differences in national wage-set-
ting systems. The monetarist regime worked in Germany because wage leadership was 
exercised by large and economically sophisticated industrial unions that had learned 
to operate within the monetary constraints. In contrast, countries with powerful but 
fragmented and competitive unions and decentralized wage-setting institutions simply 
did not have the capacity to contain the infl ationary pressures of wage competition 
(Baccaro/Simoni 2010). 
As a consequence, infl ation rates (Figure 1) and unit labor costs (Figure 2) continued to 
differ; and in order to compensate for losses in international competitiveness, exchange 
rates and bandwidths were frequently re-adjusted. And as devaluation remained a pos-
sibility, the risk premia of government bonds differed considerably among EMS mem-
ber states (Figure 3). Moreover, any attempt to defend unrealistic exchange rates would 
invite currency speculation.5 
5 De Grauwe (2009: 137–142) argues that frequent small adjustments had worked well until 1987, 
and that it was the attempt to move toward more fi xed exchange rates and greater convergence 
that made the EMS too rigid and then invited large-scale currency speculation.
Source: OECD.
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These problems persuaded European governments that moving from the EMS to a 
monetary union with irrevocably fi xed exchange rates would be desirable. It would end 
their dependence on the Bundesbank, and it would eliminate the possibility of devalu-
ation − and hence both the risk of currency speculation, and the interest-rate differen-
tials caused by the risk of devaluation. Germany in turn, which had much to lose in a 
monetary union6 but was willing to accept it as the political price for German unifi ca-
tion, was able to insist that the Bundesbank and its version of Monetarism should be-
come the model for the European system, and that candidate countries would have to 
meet tough convergence criteria as a condition of admission (Delors 1989; McNamara 
1998; Dyson/Featherstone 1999; Jones 2002; Vaubel 2010). 
6 The main loss, as will soon become clear, was the goodness-of-fi t of monetary policy. But from 
the perspective of export-oriented German industries, the pre-Maastricht EMS had also been 
an ideal arrangement. It was suffi ciently effective in dampening currency fl uctuations. And it 
also maintained the Deutschmark as an undervalued currency as other member states always 
tried, but never quite succeeded, to match the German passion for stability. This advantage was 
lost as other countries intensifi ed their efforts to meet the Maastricht criteria on price stability, 
and as Germany came to adopt the euro at an overvalued exchange rate. 
Source: OECD.
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In effect, therefore, the Maastricht Treaty protected the institutional independence of 
the European Central Bank (ECB) even more fi rmly than had been the case in Germany. 
And to ensure its monetarist orientation, the priority of price stability was specifi ed in 
the Treaty as well. Moreover, in order to gain access to the Monetary Union, EU member 
states had to remove all restrictions on capital mobility, to stabilize their exchange rates 
to the ECU, and to achieve convergence on low rates of infl ation and low public sector 
defi cits. 
Perhaps unexpectedly, these “Maastricht criteria” on infl ation, defi cits, and exchange-
rate stability were in fact met by a considerable number of unlikely candidate countries 
– sometimes through creative accounting, but mainly through heroic efforts at bud-
get consolidation and “social pacts” whose short-term effectiveness was not necessar-
ily sustainable over the longer term. In an attempt to forestall future lapses, Germany 
therefore also insisted on a “Stability and Growth Pact” that defi ned permanent limits 
on national defi cits and indebtedness together with seemingly tough sanctioning pro-
cedures (Heipertz/Verdun 2010). 
Source: OECD.
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4 From 1999 to 2007: Monetarism in a non-optimal currency area
Initially, the Monetary Union did indeed fulfi ll the hopes of its supporters. The widely 
resented dominance of the Bundesbank was replaced by a common European central 
bank that targeted its policy choices on average infl ation rates and output gaps in the 
eurozone, rather than on the state of the German economy. National infl ation rates 
that had steeply declined in the run-up to the euro continued to remain signifi cantly 
lower than they had been in the 1990s (Figure 4) and, most importantly, fi nancial mar-
kets honored the elimination of devaluation risks, so that interest rates on government 
bonds and commercial credit declined steeply to the German level in all EMU member 
states (Figure 3). The result was an initial boost to economic growth in those eurozone 
economies where interest rates had fallen – which of course was not the case in Ger-
many (Figure 5). Despite the pre-1999 convergence, therefore, member states entered 
the EMU in signifi cantly differing economic circumstances. 
Such conditions had been discussed earlier under the rubric of whether the EMU 
could be considered an “optimum currency area” − defi ned by high mobility of capital 
and labor and the availability of inter-regional transfers to deal with the possibility of 
“asymmetric shocks” (Mundell 1961; McKinnon 1963; Eichengreen 1990; Eichengreen/
Frieden 1994). When compared to the United States, these conditions were lacking in 
Source: OECD.
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Europe.7 But given the political commitment to monetary unifi cation, and the encour-
aging effects of national efforts to meet the Maastricht convergence criteria, optimism 
prevailed: Considering national public-sector defi cits as the main challenge to price 
stability, and assuming that the Stability Pact would effectively control these, it was ex-
pected that the increasing integration of capital and goods markets would also ensure a 
continuing convergence of prices, wages and business cycles (Issing 2002). As it turned 
out, however, these expectations were misleading8 for two related reasons. 
7 Lars Jonung and Eoin Drea (2010) provide a comprehensive survey of American economic 
analyses of European monetary integration from 1989 to 2002. They argue that initial skepti-
cism was based on a static interpretation of the optimal currency area that ignored the dynamic 
impact of currency union on trade and factor mobility, and that a more optimistic view also 
came to prevail in academic analyses as the success of the Maastricht convergence criteria be-
came apparent. Remarkably, however, none of these contributions seem to have focused on 
differences in wage-setting systems as a factor affecting the conditions of “optimality,” and it 
appears as if only Milton Friedman was explicitly worried about the effect of unitary monetary 
policy on divergent member economies (Jonung/Drea 2010: 29). 
8 They were right in predicting that (1) monetary union would increase trade fl ows and capital 
fl ows, and that (2) increasing trade fl ows under a common currency would tend to equalize the 
prices of tradable goods and services. There was no reason to think, however, that (3) prices in 
the non-traded sector would also be equalized. Thus differences in infl ation rates could persist 
even though the euro-level average rate was constrained by ECB monetary policy, and even 
though differences in consumer prices were reduced by price convergence in the traded sector.
Source: OECD.
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On the one hand, the political crash programs, through which unlikely candidate coun-
tries had achieved an impressive convergence on the Maastricht criteria, had generally 
not addressed the underlying structural and institutional differences that had originally 
caused economic divergence. Once access was achieved, these differences would reassert 
themselves (Willett et al. 2010). 
On the other hand, ECB monetary impulses refl ected average economic conditions in 
the eurozone and hence could not be targeted at the conditions of specifi c national 
economies. In effect, therefore, the crucial precondition of Monetarism – a precise fi t 
between money supply and growth potential of a specifi c economy – would not exist 
in a heterogeneous monetary union. In other words, the European Central Bank could 
not be expected to reproduce the Bundesbank’s success in Germany. Instead of ensur-
ing steady, infl ation-free economic growth in the member economies of the EMU, the 
ECB’s uniform monetary policy would amplify deviant dynamics in economies above 
and below the average (Sinn et al. 2004; Enderlein 2004). 
For countries with below-average rates of economic growth and infl ation, the uniform 
ECB interest rates were too high, and the real interest rates faced by domestic consum-
ers and investors were even higher – with the consequence that initially weak economic 
activity was depressed even further by restrictive monetary impulses. For countries 
Source: Own calculation by OECD data.
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with above-average rates of inflation, by contrast, ECB monetary policy was too loose, 
nominal interest rates were too low, and real interest rates became extremely low or 
even negative (Figure 6). Thus, the boost to economic activity that former weak-cur-
rency countries had received through the fall of nominal interest to German levels was 
subsequently intensified and accelerated by ECB monetary policy.
In dealing with the dynamics introduced by miss-specified monetary impulses, the 
Monetary Union left member states to their own devices. Since the “non-political” 
monetary and exchange-rate instruments of macroeconomic management were Euro-
peanized, that meant that governments would again have to resort to those “Keynesian” 
instruments of fiscal and incomes policy which, because of their much greater political 
salience, had failed in most countries when they were employed in the 1970s. But this is 
not the complete story. Like its Keynesian counterpart, monetarist theory is ostensibly 
concerned with the management of aggregate economic demand. But unlike Keynes-
ianism, its “micro foundations” are provided by neoclassical micro-economics and its 
postulate of perfect markets. For its promoters it seemed therefore plausible to consider 
problems that might still arise under a monetarist regime as the consequence of im-
perfectly flexible product and labor markets. In practice therefore, demand-oriented 
monetarist macroeconomics were typically associated with a panoply of “supply-side” 
policy recommendations, including tax cuts, privatization, liberalization, deregulation 
and, if need be, union busting (all of which had been part of Margaret Thatcher’s and 
Ronald Reagan’s monetarist programs). There is no question, however, that the use of 
these instruments would also have very high political salience in EMU member polities. 
Germany: The sick man of Europe rescued by union wage restraint
The first victim of miss-specified monetary impulses was Germany (Spethmann/ Stei-
ger 2005). Before 1999, not only nominal interest rates, but also real interest rates had 
been lowest in Germany. With entry into the Monetary Union, however, these com-
parative advantages were lost. Since nominal interest rates converged whereas German 
inflation rates continued to be lower, real interest rates in Germany became the highest 
in the eurozone (Figure 6). As a consequence, economic growth was lower in Germany 
than in almost all EMU member economies (Figure 5), unemployment increased dra-
matically from 2000 to 2005 (Figure 7), as did social expenditures, whereas tax revenues 
fell by 2.4 percentage points from 2000 to 2004. 
In responding to this deep recession, Germany could not rely on any one of the instru-
ments of macroeconomic management. Where the Bundesbank would have lowered 
interest rates in response to the rapidly increasing output gap, ECB interest rates were 
causing the problem. And where an autonomous government would have resorted to 
fiscal reflation, Germany came to violate the 3-percent deficit limit of the Stability Pact 
by merely allowing the “automatic stabilizers” to operate. And as monetary as well as 
14 MPIfG Discussion Paper 11/11
fi scal refl ation was ruled out, incomes policy also could not be employed as an instru-
ment for demand expansion. Even if unions, in the face of rising mass unemployment, 
had been able to achieve wage increases exceeding productivity gains plus infl ation, the 
positive effect on domestic demand would have been overshadowed by job losses due 
to reduced profi tability and falling export demand. 
Instead, Germany’s large industrial unions from the export sectors decided to protect 
existing jobs through wage restraint – a supply-side strategy that allowed employers to 
capture most of the productivity gains in the hope of stabilizing employment by im-
proving the profi tability of domestic production and the competitiveness of German 
industries in international markets.9 At the same time, however, stagnant or falling real 
wages (Figure 8) would further reduce domestic demand and keep infl ation below the 
EMU average – with negative effects on domestic economic growth and on imports. 
And the Red-Green government on its part, bereft of all demand-side policy options, 
was also pushed toward supply-side policies. Between 2000 and 2005, the government 
managed to reduce taxes on company profi ts and capital incomes, to lower the level of 
9 In real terms, German unions helped to re-establish the advantages of an undervalued currency 
– providing the functional equivalents of export subsidies and import duties in ways which 
could not be challenged under the EU’s competition and internal-market rules.
Source: OECD.
Figure 7 Unemployment rates (age 25–64)
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employment protection primarily by deregulating temporary and part-time employ-
ment (Figure 9), and to drastically cut benefi ts to the long-term unemployed in order to 
reduce the reservation wage of job seekers (Trampusch 2009). There is no question that 
these policies were not only highly salient but also extremely unpopular, especially with 
the supporters of the social-democratic governing party. Mass demonstrations against 
the welfare reforms and the rise of a left-wing protest party brought about the defeat 
of the Red-Green government in the 2005 elections. Apart from this change in parti-
san fortunes, there was also a signifi cant decline of lower-class electoral participation – 
which does indeed suggest a more serious erosion of political legitimacy (Schäfer 2010).
Economically, however, the combination of extreme wage restraint practiced by German 
unions and the government’s supply-side policies achieved its hoped-for effect. Export 
demand and, eventually, employment in the export industries and in a growing low-
wage sector increased, and registered unemployment began to decline after 2005 (Fig-
ure 7). In effect, Germany, which had been the “sick man of Europe” between 2000 and 
2005, managed to pull itself out of the long recession to become once more one of the 
strongest European economies at the onset of the international fi nancial crisis in 2007. 
In an integrated economic environment, however, successful supply-side policies which 
reduce the cost and increase the profi tability of domestic production in one country 
Figure 8 Real compensation per employee (Index 2000 = 100)
Deflator private consumption. 
Source: Ameco database.
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must inevitably have the effect of beggar-my-neighbor strategies on its competitors (De 
Grauwe 2009, 112; Flassbeck 2010). In the process of coping with its own crisis, therefore, 
Germany also contributed to the economic vulnerability of other eurozone economies, 
and to the increasing current-account imbalances among these economies (Figure 10).10
The rise and increasing vulnerability of GIPS economies
In the former soft-currency countries – I will look at Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain, 
labeling them GIPS economies – accession to the EMU had the initial effect of inter-
est rates falling to much lower German levels. The sudden availability of cheap capital, 
whose domestic attractiveness was further increased by near-zero or even negative real 
10 The link is established by a combination of three different mechanisms: By cutting costs and 
constraining domestic demand, Germany increased exports and reduced imports in relation 
to the rest of the world. Since revenues from the export surplus were not fully consumed or 
invested in Germany, they were available for investment and credit in those economies where, 
for reasons to be discussed below, demand for consumer and investment credit was particularly 
high. In effect therefore, German capital exports came to fi nance rising imports and increasing 
indebtedness in recipient economies. 
Index scale of 0–6 from weakest to strongest protection. 
Source: OECD.
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Figure 9 Strictness of employment protection (temporary employment)
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interest rates, fuelled credit-fi nanced domestic demand in Greece, Ireland and Spain 
(though less so in Portugal, for reasons that I have not been able to explore). In Spain and 
Ireland, in particular, cheap credit came to fi nance real-estate investments and rapidly 
rising housing prices which, eventually, would turn into bubbles. As a consequence, eco-
nomic growth (Figure 5), employment (Figure 11), per-capita incomes (Figure 12) and 
prices (Figure 4) continued to increase. At the same time, real wages (Figure 8) and unit 
labor costs (Figure 13) also increased.11 As a consequence, imports would rise, export 
competitiveness would suffer and defi cits of current accounts would increase (Figure 10). 
11 The mechanism is complex: The initial fall of interest rates facilitated the rise of credit-fi nanced 
consumer and investment demand. In the traded sector, imports would rise, prices would be 
constrained, and employment might fall. In the non-traded sector, however, increasing de-
mand would raise domestic production and employment and create room for wage increases. 
Whether this would be exploited depends on national wage-setting institutions. In Sweden and 
Austria, centralized wage bargaining was generally able to prevent increases that would hurt 
international competitiveness in the traded sector. In Germany, the same effect is traditionally 
achieved by the wage leadership of the big industrial unions. But where such institutions do not 
exist, union competition and egalitarian norms of “comparability” will favor the diffusion of 
wage increases achieved in branches with the greatest ability to pay, or the least ability to resist 
(Scharpf 1991; Baccaro/Simoni 2010). In the traded sector, therefore, wages may rise even as 
employment is shrinking. 
Source: OECD.
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Figure 10 Current account as a percentage of GDP
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Even if they had considered the decline of their external balances a serious problem, 
however, the governments in GIPS economies found no effective way to counteract 
domestic booms that were driven by the cheap-money effect of uniform ECB interest 
rates. Spain and Ireland at least tried to achieve some restraint through the instruments 
of macroeconomic policy that were still available nationally. But their attempts to con-
tain wage infl ation through a series of social pacts (Baccaro/Simoni 2010) and to prac-
tice fi scal constraint by running budget surpluses (Figure 15) proved insuffi cient. What 
could have made a difference was monetary restraint, which would have impeded the 
credit-fi nanced overheating of the Greek, Irish and Spanish economies. This, however, 
would have required differentiated, rather than uniform, monetary policies that would 
not be defi ned by eurozone averages but targeted to the specifi c conditions and prob-
lems of the individual economies.12 Such approaches,13 however, played no role in the 
12 De Grauwe (2009: 177–182) shows how the higher interest rates required (under the “Taylor 
rule”) for high growth economies such as Ireland, Greece or Spain would be systematically out-
voted in the ECB Governing Council under the infl uence of the ECB Board whose members are 
assumed to target average eurozone conditions. 
13 In the history of economic theory, the need for and the feasibility of differentiated solutions had 
been postulated by the renowned Swedish economist Erik Lindahl (1930). In his view, the cen-
tral bank of a monetary union of independent states would need to correct diverging business 
cycles and infl ation rates in member economies by differentiating the supply of central-bank 
money that national central banks could offer to national banks – which would in turn lead to 
Source: Own calculation by OECD Data.
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construction of either the European Monetary Union or of the Stability Pact (Heipertz/
Verdun 2010), nor were they considered by mainstream monetary economics prior to 
the present crisis (De Grauwe 2009; but see, De Grauwe 2011).14 Under the dominant 
view, the ECB was responsible only for average price stability in the eurozone as a whole, 
whereas all adjustment problems of individual economies were to be dealt with by EMU 
member states.
At the onset of the fi nancial crisis, the GIPS economies therefore found themselves in 
extremely vulnerable positions defi ned by severe current-account defi cits, an extreme 
dependence on capital infl ows and severely overvalued real exchange rates. For coun-
tries with independent currencies (unless that currency was the US dollar), this process 
could not have continued for long. Under fi xed exchange rates, it would be stopped 
nationally differing interest rates. It has recently been argued, albeit by heterodox economists, 
that such options could also be realized in the EMU (Spethmann/Steiger 2005).
14 One would of course need to know whether, under present conditions of high capital mobility, 
the effect of differentiated monetary policies would be immediately wiped out by arbitrage, or 
whether some forms of capital controls could be designed to ensure their effectiveness. More-
over, one would have to explore the political and intra-institutional implications for ECB mon-
etary policy if it were to become responsible for explicitly discriminating measures addressed to 
individual member economies. 
 
Source: Ameco Database.
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by a balance-of-payments crisis, and under flexible rates, devaluation would raise the 
price of imports and restore the competitiveness of exports. In the Monetary Union, 
however, external constraints were eliminated. Foreign investors and creditors were no 
longer concerned about currency risks, and banks in countries such as Germany were 
happy to re-invest export incomes in bonds and asset-based securities issued by Greek, 
Spanish or Irish banks. Hence the rapidly increasing deficits of current accounts were 
not corrected, but financed through equally increasing capital flows from surplus to 
deficit economies in the eurozone (Figure 14). By the same token, of course, real ef-
fective exchange rates diverged as well, with Germany benefitting from an increasingly 
undervalued currency, and GIPS economies suffering from over-valuation (Figure 17). 
What eventually mattered most was the increasing dependence on capital inflows and 
the rise of external – and mainly private15 – indebtedness, which left GIPS economies 
15 In contrast to the currently popular narratives, external indebtedness even in Greece and Por-
tugal was mainly, and exclusively in Spain and Ireland due to private-sector rather than public-
sector borrowing. Thus in 2007, the year prior to the financial crisis, Greece’s external balance 
had amounted to –14.67 % of GDP, to which public-sector borrowing contributed only –5.3 %. 
The respective figures for Portugal were –9.78 % and –2.65 %. In Spain (–10.02 % and +1.09 %) 
and Ireland (–5.34 % and +0.14 %), public sector surpluses had actually reduced the external 
imbalance (Eurostat data).
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Figure 13 Unit labor costs (total economy; Index 2000 = 100)
Ratio of compensation per employee to real GDP per person employed. 
Source: Ameco Database.
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extremely vulnerable to disturbances in international fi nancial markets that might pro-
voke capital fl ight.16 Hence even if the toughened version of the Stability Pact that is 
presently being enacted had been in place in 2007, it would have done little to reduce 
the economic vulnerability of the GIPS economies. In any event, however, under the 
rules of the Monetary Union that were then in place, neither rising current-accounts 
defi cits nor the increasing dependence of GIPS economies on capital imports and di-
vergent real exchange rates were treated as problems that might require intervention by 
either the Commission or the European Central Bank.
The Stability Pact was supposed to deal only with excessive budget defi cits (Figure 15) 
and, what is even more important, it did not differentiate between defi cits incurred in a 
recession or in high-growth periods. Thus after Germany (with the support of France) 
had successfully resisted punishment for operating automatic stabilizers during its deep 
recession between 2000 and 2005, it would have been politically diffi cult to prosecute 
high-growth Greece (even if its defi cit had been correctly reported). But while the Sta-
bility Pact could and should have been invoked against Greece, it was simply irrelevant 
16 Excessive external indebtedness caused by capital infl ows did of course also occur in countries 
with their own currency whose central bank had stimulated the demand for credit through low 
interest rates. But in that case, a sudden capital fl ight would produce devaluation, rather than a 
liquidity and solvency crisis (de Grauwe 2011).
Figure 14 Capital and financial balance as a percentage of GDP
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for Spain and Ireland. Compared to Germany, their governments were models of fiscal 
probity, running budget surpluses in most years up to 2007, and reducing total public-
sector debt far below the official target of 60 percent of GDP (Figure 16). Even though, 
in the absence of monetary restraint, sound macroeconomic management might have 
required even more aggressive fiscal retrenchment, there was nothing in the Stability 
Pact to suggest to governments that this might be a European requirement. 
At the same time, the ECB also saw no reason for alarm as average eurozone inflation 
rates remained within the limits to which its monetary policy was committed. And while 
all GIPS economies had higher rates than Germany, these were not exorbitantly higher 
and seemed not to accelerate (Figure 4). This may appear surprising since the bursting 
of credit-financed real-estate bubbles in Ireland and Spain is now seen as a major cause 
of the present crises in these countries. But technically, escalating real-estate and housing 
prices are defined as “asset price inflation” which the ECB, like other central banks, will 
only take into account when its “wealth effect” is expected to also affect the rise of con-
sumer prices (Trichet 2005; de Grauwe 2009: 207–209).17 Furthermore, the rise of con-
sumer prices in GIPS economies continued to be constrained by lower-priced imports.
17 In hindsight it seems obvious that the Irish and Spanish (or American and British) governments 
could have halted their real-estate bubbles through legislation tightening the availability of hous-
Source: Ameco Database.
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Summary: The eurozone on the eve of the crisis
By 2007, conditions in the eurozone could therefore be described as follows: The Mon-
etary Union had achieved its proximate political purposes by eliminating currency fluc-
tuations and interest-rate differentials among its member economies. At the same time, 
however, it had deprived member governments of the monetary and exchange-rate in-
struments of macroeconomic management and it had tried, through the Stability Pact, 
to also constrain their employment of fiscal instruments. But since the eurozone was 
not an “optimal currency area,” the imposition of one-size-fits-all ECB interest rates 
produced “asymmetric” impulses in EMU economies, with above-average or below-
average rates of growth and inflation. In low-growth Germany, high real interest rates 
had deepened and prolonged a recession which, since monetary as well as fiscal refla-
tion were ruled out, was eventually overcome through wage restraint and supply-side 
“reforms” that constrained domestic demand and increased export competitiveness. In 
GIPS economies, by contrast, very low real interest rates had fueled credit-financed 
economic growth and employment, but also rapid increases in unit labor costs that 
ing credit. But if even central-bank economists see no way to distinguish between price increases 
determined by “rational markets” and “speculative” excesses, it would have taken a good deal of 
political courage for governments to stop the party on grounds of old-fashioned paternalism.
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Figure 16 General government gross debt as a percentage of GDP
Source: Ameco Database.
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reduced export competitiveness. The resulting rise of current-account defi cits was ac-
commodated by equally rising capital infl ows from investors in surplus economies lead-
ing to rising external debts accumulated primarily or exclusively in the private sector. 
As a consequence, GIPS economies were becoming extremely vulnerable to potential 
disturbances in international fi nancial markets that might induce capital fl ight – fol-
lowed by potential liquidity and solvency crises. 
Governments in GIPS countries may have been as unconcerned as the American or Brit-
ish governments about the rise of these imbalances. But even where they tried to con-
strain their overheating economies, through fi scal retrenchment and attempts at wage 
moderation, the instruments of macroeconomic policy that were still available to nation-
al governments proved insuffi cient to neutralize the expansionary effects of EMU mon-
etary impulses. At the same time, the escalating economic imbalances and vulnerabilities 
were also of no concern to EMU policy makers, neither for the Commission enforcing 
the Stability Pact nor for the ECB carrying out its mandate to ensure price stability.
70
80
90
100
110
120
130
Based on unit labour costs (total economy). 
Source: Ameco Database.
Figure 17 Real effective exchange rates (Index 2000 = 100)
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5 From 2008 to 2010: A sequence of three crises
The question as to how long the external imbalances in the eurozone could have contin-
ued, and whether they could have been gradually corrected by market forces or would 
soon have ended in a crash, has become academic. In the real world, the international fi-
nancial crisis of 2008 triggered chain reactions which, in the eurozone, had the effect of 
transforming the vulnerability of deficit countries into a systemic crisis that is thought 
to challenge the viability of the Monetary Union itself. The much-researched story is 
far too complex to be retold here in any detail, but for present purposes a thumb-nail 
sketch of three distinct, but causally connected crises will suffice (Jones 2009). 
Initially, the direct impact of the American “subprime mortgage crisis” and the Lehm-
an bankruptcy was limited to European countries that had allowed their banks to in-
vest heavily in “toxic” American securities. Apart from the UK, the main victims were 
Germany and Ireland, whereas banking regulations in Spain had effectively prevented 
Spanish banks from engaging in off-balance activities abroad. As a consequence, the 
budget deficits of countries that had to rescue “system-relevant” private or public banks, 
escalated to previously unheard-of levels (Figure 15). 
The secondary impact of the international financial crisis was a dramatic credit squeeze 
on the real economy as banks had to write off insecure assets on their balance sheets 
while mutual distrust brought interbank lending to a halt. As a consequence, economic 
activity declined and unemployment increased in those countries immediately affect-
ed by the banking crisis, with these effects spreading quickly to other closely-linked 
economies. In addition to the fiscal effects of bank bailouts, governments therefore had 
to accept a steep decline in tax revenues and an equally steep rise in expenditures on 
unemployment and on the protection of existing jobs. Obviously, however, the effects 
of the credit squeeze hit hardest those countries whose economic activity had come 
to depend most on the availability of cheap credit and massive capital inflows– which 
in the eurozone was the case for GIPS economies. In Ireland and Spain, moreover, the 
real-estate bubble had burst under the impact of the recession, and mortgage defaults 
created a secondary banking crisis in which governments had to rescue even more fi-
nancial institutions (or their creditors in financial institutions of surplus economies). 
The result was an even more dramatic rise of public-sector deficits and debt ratios even 
in countries such as Spain and Ireland whose indebtedness had been far below the eu-
rozone average (Figure 16). 
In the process, thirdly (and belatedly), international rating agencies and investors 
ceased to be satisfied with the elimination of currency risks and finally began to worry 
about the sustainability of public-sector indebtedness – in particular for those coun-
tries whose current-account deficits suggested economic weaknesses that might also 
affect the government’s capacity to meet financial commitments. As this happened, the 
price of outstanding bonds declined, refinancing as well as the placement of new issues 
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became diffi cult, and the convergence of nominal interest rates to German levels came 
to an end. As a consequence, after 2008 risk premia on sovereign debt rose to very high 
and practically prohibitive levels (Figure 18).
The specter of “sovereign default” arose fi rst in Greece. There, the incoming Pasok gov-
ernment had to admit that public sector defi cits (which had signifi cantly violated the 
Stability Pact even during the high-growth years following accession to the eurozone 
in 2001) had in fact been grossly under-reported by its predecessors. Confronted with 
the potential repercussions of Greek bankruptcy on their own banks, and with specula-
tive attacks on other EMU member states, capital-exporting countries agreed to create 
a common “Stability Mechanism” that would ensure Greek government obligations − 
this was soon followed by the much larger European Financial Stability Fund (EFSF) 
whose guarantees were fi rst invoked by Ireland and now also by Portugal. In each case, 
governments had to accept extremely tough commitments to fi scal retrenchment and 
supply-side policy reforms – which are now becoming the model for a general regime 
of fi scal supervision and control in the eurozone. 
Source: OECD.
Figure 18 Interest rates of 10-year government bonds
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6 Beyond the rescue operations: Options for a viable EMU?
The commitment to create a rescue fund must be understood in the light of its perceived 
alternative: If GIPS states had gone bankrupt they could have left the Monetary Union 
and returned to their former national currencies at an exchange rate that corrected the 
real effective over-valuation. In theory, that would have re-established the international 
viability of their economies. But domestically the transition would have been very pain-
ful, and its technical difficulties were perceived as being so overwhelming18 that no 
practical solutions in that direction were even tentatively considered. At the same time, 
the European Commission, the ECB and the governments of surplus countries also 
rejected the “bankruptcy-cum-devaluation” scenario for reasons of their own which, 
not necessarily in the order importance, could be listed as follows: (1) if GIPS states 
left the EMU, it would be perceived as a major setback for European integration; (2) it 
would encourage speculative attacks on other EMU member states; (3) bankruptcies of 
GIPS states would entail heavy losses for banks in surplus countries and for the ECB; 
and (4) the expected revaluation of the euro would hurt export industries in Germany 
and other surplus economies that benefited from an undervalued real exchange rate. 
Given these beliefs, expensive guarantees and credits appeared as a lesser evil that was 
necessary to keep GIPS countries within the Monetary Union (and, perhaps, to provide 
a push for European solidarity and political integration). 
The rescue-cum-retrenchment program
The immediate goal of the rescue programs was to avoid bankruptcy by providing ac-
cess to credit at rates that did not include exorbitant risk premia. This goal was be-
ing pursued through a combination of guarantees, ECB open market operations (Sinn 
2011) and direct loans provided by the IMF, and by the stability funds set up by the 
EU (EFSM) and by the EMU member states (EFSF). As a consequence, Greece, Ireland 
and now Portugal have so far been able to avoid insolvency. By themselves, however, 
the guarantees and credits can only buy time. In order to ensure that governments will 
be able to restore the confidence of financial markets, they are coupled with stringent 
“conditionalities” which are meant to reduce the short-term need for credit through 
rigorous fiscal retrenchment. At the same time, moreover, the conditions imposed are 
meant to facilitate economic recovery and to restore the international viability of the 
economies in question. 
18 As George Selgin (2010: 79) put it: “In effect, the authorities kicked away the ladder Europe’s 
economies had scaled to establish a common currency, leaving Europeans with no equally con-
venient way of retreating to the status quo ante.” Thus American economists who had warned 
against creating the EMU were now convinced that the exit option was effectively foreclosed 
(Eichengreen 1990, 2010). 
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Thus the Commission’s “Economic Adjustment Programme for Greece” of May 2010 
postulated two goals to be pursued over the coming years: 
The immediate priority is to contain the government’s financing needs and reassure markets 
of the determination of authorities to do whatever it takes to secure medium – and long-term 
fiscal sustainability. 
In parallel with short-term anti-crisis fiscal measures, there is a need to prepare and implement 
an ambitious structural reform agenda to strengthen external competitiveness, accelerate real-
location of resources from the non-tradable to the tradable sector, and foster growth.
(Commission 2010a: 10–90)
The Program accordingly included immediate increases of VAT and excise taxes, cuts to 
public-sector wages, pensions, social expenditures and public investments, and would 
continue from 2011–2014 with a long list of further tax increases and expenditure cut-
backs. The structural reforms to which the government had to commit itself included the 
implementation of an ambitious pension reform,” reforms of the budgeting and tax sys-
tems and of public administration, plus “ambitious labor and product market reforms.”
Even though some of these commitments might have appeared somewhat vague, they 
were specified in much greater detail and continuously tightened by a “Memorandum 
of Understanding on Specific Economic Policy Conditionality” (Memorandum 2010) 
and its quarterly “updates.” These are used to assess progress achieved, to extend the 
range of required structural reforms and to specify concrete requirements to be met in 
the following periods19. These Memoranda cut ever more deeply into details of national 
legislation.20 And the opening paragraphs of the Greek and Irish Memoranda and of all 
subsequent updates leave no doubt as to who is in control of these “understandings”:
The quarterly disbursements of bilateral financial assistance … are subject to quarterly reviews 
of conditionality for the duration of the arrangement. The release of the tranches will be based 
on observance of quantitative performance criteria and a positive evaluation of progress made 
with respect to policy criteria in … this memorandum. 
19 Exactly the same approach has been used in the “Economic Adjustment Programme for Ireland” 
published in February 2011 (Commission 2011), and there is no reason to think that it will not 
also be used for Portugal.
20 To illustrate this in the Greek case, the “second update” of 22 November 2010 contained a com-
mitment to “comprehensive reform of the health care system” which in the “third update” of 
23 February 2011 came to include detailed targets for the pricing of generics and for the meth-
ods by which social security funds pay physicians. Similarly, where the original agreement had 
contained a commitment to “ambitious labor market reforms,” the second update specified 
a new law allowing firm-level collective agreements to prevail over sector and occupational 
agreements, and the third update committed the government to “simplify the procedure for the 
creation of firm-level trade unions.” In the Irish case, the “Memorandum of Understanding” of 
8 December 2010 was more detailed on reforms of the banking system but also included precise 
commitments on labor market and pension reforms, on cuts in public-sector employment and 
pay, on cuts in social programs and reductions of the statutory minimum wage.
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The authorities commit to consult with the European Commission, the ECB and the IMF on 
the adoption of policies that are not consistent with this Memorandum. They will also provide 
the European Commission, the ECB and the IMF with all information requested that is avail-
able to monitor progress during programme implementation and to track the economic and 
fi nancial situation. Prior to the release of the instalments, the authorities shall provide a compli-
ance report on the fulfi lment of the conditionality.21
In other words, once an EMU member state has applied for the protection of European 
rescue funds, its government operates under a form of “receivership.”22 European and IMF 
authorities defi ne the criteria to be treated as “conditionality”; the Commission analyzes 
fi nancial and economic problems, defi nes the policy choices that are required, monitors 
compliance and evaluates progress or failure. Of course it prefers to do this in consulta-
tion with national authorities and expertise. But in cases of disagreement, the bargaining 
21 Quoted from the Irish Memorandum of 3 December 2010. <http://ec.europa.eu/economy_fi -
nance/articles/eu_economic_situation/pdf/2010-12-07-mou_en.pdf>
22 In the recent blog from Max Keiser, a British TV presenter and former Wall Street broker, the 
Greek situation is equated with an occupation regime imposed by the “Troika” of EU, ECB and 
IMF authorities. <http://maxkeiser.com/2011/04/28/the-greek-government%E2%80%99s-
betrayal-of-greece-to-the-foreign-occupational-forces-of-the-troika>
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power of the national government is minimal – except that it might still threaten to com-
mit political suicide or to reconsider the “bankruptcy-cum-devaluation” option. 
It appears doubtful whether the policies imposed by these “rescue-cum-retrenchment” 
regimes, assuming that they would be faithfully implemented, will have a chance of 
succeeding economically over the medium term. The short-term results, at any rate, do 
not look promising: Total debt burdens are still increasing (Figure 16), and the interest 
rates for government bonds still seem to be on the rise (Figure 19). At the same time, 
GIPS economies continue to be in a deep recession, with negative or near-zero rates 
of economic growth in 2010 and 2011, and with unemployment rates of 15 percent 
in 2011 in Greece, 14 percent in Ireland, 11–12 percent in Portugal and 20 percent in 
Spain23 (Figure 20). In order to meet their minimal political responsibilities, therefore, 
governments must deal with high and rising expenditures on unemployment and wel-
fare benefi ts and they must cope with falling, rather than rising tax revenues – with the 
implication that despite current denials a severe “restructuring” of existing debt may 
become unavoidable. 
23 IMF World Economic Outlook, April 2011. 
 <http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2011/01/pdf/tblpartb.pdf>
Figure 20 Harmonised unemployment rate (all persons)
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Political implications
In purely economic terms, therefore, the immediate outcomes of the “rescue-cum-re-
trenchment” program will not differ greatly from those anticipated in the “bankruptcy-
cum-devaluation” scenario. In both cases, creditors should not expect full repayment, 
and in both cases, international economic viability can only be re-achieved by wage de-
creases in the traded sector to correct the gap in real effective exchange rates (Figure 17). 
But the political implications and distributional consequences would be quite different. 
“Bankruptcy-cum-devaluation” would be experienced as a sudden shock hitting the 
country as a whole and which, by dramatically increasing the price of imports, would 
reduce all domestic real incomes at the same time. Beyond that, however, all cruelties 
would have been inflicted by the devaluation itself, and national policy and politics 
could then be about damage control, burden sharing and reconstruction. 
The opposite is true under the “rescue-cum-retrenchment” program that is presently 
being enacted. Here, all cruelties must be proposed, defended, adopted and implement-
ed over an extended period by the national government. In fact, the program amounts 
to a greatly radicalized version of the supply-side reforms adopted in Germany dur-
ing its (much milder) recession before 2005 – which destroyed political support for 
Schröder’s Red-Green government. But whereas Schröder had the chance of developing 
and defending self-chosen reforms, the governments of Greece, Ireland and Portugal 
must implement policies likely to be seen as dictates from Commission bureaucrats 
and self-interested foreign governments trying to protect their own banks, investors 
and export industries. 
If these are extremely difficult political conditions, they will be exacerbated by the distri-
butional implications. In both scenarios it is clear that the non-traded sector will lose out, 
and that export-oriented industries and services ought to gain. Beyond that, however, 
the higher profitability for investments in export-oriented production will have been 
achieved by the devaluation itself, whereas in the “rescue-cum-retrenchment” program 
it must be created by governments adopting and implementing policies that must mas-
sively and visibly hurt workers and welfare recipients while favoring profits and capital 
owners. As was the case in Germany, the inevitable result will be a rise in social inequal-
ity24 and social protest. From the political perspective of GIPS governments, therefore, 
“bankruptcy-cum-devaluation” may indeed now appear as the lesser of two evils.
24 In fact, Germany was one of the OECD countries where social inequality increased the most 
between the mid 1990s and the mid 2000s – whereas inequality had decreased in Greece, Spain 
and Ireland (OECD 2008).
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From rescue operations to EMU reform
But the fate of the economies and governments of GIPS countries is only part of a larger 
process of EMU reforms that are presently under way. In this regard, it is indeed unfor-
tunate that worries about the euro were triggered by the Greek solvency crisis – which 
was initially seen as the self-inflicted result of fiscal profligacy: If Greek governments 
had not engaged in reckless borrowing,25 it is now widely argued, the euro crisis would 
not have arisen, and if the Commission had not been duped by faked records, rigorous 
enforcement of the Stability Pact would have prevented it. So even though the more 
“virtuous” member states are now unable to refuse help to the “sinners,” such conditions 
should never be allowed to reoccur. And even though this explanation of the problem is 
only partly correct for Greece, and totally wrong for Ireland and Spain, it still dominates 
debate about the crisis in the “rescuer” countries, and it frames the approach to reform-
ing the EMU regime. 
The “Excessive Deficit Procedure” (EDP), that is to be put into place under Article 126 
TFEU, amounts to a tougher version of the Stability Pact − with greater emphasis on 
the rapid and continuous reduction of total public-sector debt, on the preventive su-
pervision of national budgeting processes, on earlier interventions and sanctions and 
“reverse majority” rules for the adoption of more severe sanctions by the Council (Com-
mission 2010b).26 But at least the Commission seems also to have realized that budget-
ary discipline alone, no matter how rigidly enforced, would not have prevented the 
crises in Ireland and Spain – where the steep rise in public-sector deficits was clearly a 
consequence, rather than a cause, of the financial and economic crisis. 
Hence the Commission now also considers “macroeconomic imbalances” as proximate 
causes of the present crises, and it has proposed to strengthen the Treaty commitment 
to coordinated economic policy (Art. 121 TFEU) by an “Excessive Imbalance Proce-
dure” (Commission 2010c). Its focus will be on current account balances, unit labor 
costs, real effective exchange rates, total (public and private) indebtedness and other 
potentially critical aspects of national economic performance. Its central instrument 
will be a “scoreboard” with a limited (but expandable) list of performance indicators, 
complete with upper and lower “alert thresholds.” On this basis, “complemented by eco-
nomic judgment and national expertise,” the Commission will then identify member 
states “deemed at risk of imbalance,” followed by “country-specific in-depth reviews,” 
“preventive recommendations” and in the event of “excessive imbalances,” Council rec-
ommendations of corrective action, with deadlines attached and with compliance to 
25 A major factor seems to have been a particularly pronounced inability or unwillingness to col-
lect taxes. According to OECD figures, Greek tax revenue declined from 37.8 percent of GDP in 
2000 to 32.6 percent in 2008. 
26 At the same time, however, the proposed Regulation (7843/11) seems to soften some of the 
rigidities of the original Stability Pact by relating its deficit rules to the “medium-term rate of 
potential GDP growth” – this obviously places lots of trust in the reliability of economic fore-
casts or gives lots of room for discretionary judgments by the Commission. 
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be monitored by the Commission. If governments fail to comply, the Commission may 
again propose fines that the Council can only oppose through qualified majority vote.27 
This ambitious program, which had the support of the Van-Rompuy Committee, was 
approved by the ECOFIN Council on March 15, 2011,28 and is to be adopted in June 
through a series of regulations. It appears remarkable for a number of reasons. First, 
it replaces the rule-based approach of the Maastricht Treaty and the original Stability 
Pact with a highly discretionary regime of supranational economic management. Even 
the new EDP will now refer to projections of “potential growth” for its assessment of 
national budgets. And the EIP must depend on disputable hypotheses regarding the 
causal relevance of specific indicators and the critical significance of upper and lower 
thresholds (quite apart from the politically unresolved issue of whether symmetrical 
controls should be imposed on surplus and deficit economies). Moreover, practically 
all the indicators discussed refer to phenomena which, unlike public-sector budgets, 
are not under the direct control of national governments. Because government capacity 
to exercise indirect influence over such variables as nominal wages, private saving and 
spending, consumer credit, etc. may either be non-existent or widely varying among 
member states, compliance with the “recommendations” issued by the Commission 
may well be impossible. 
The worst of three worlds
Remarkably, moreover, there is no acknowledgment in any of the supporting docu-
ments of the role that uniform ECB interest rates played in causing macroeconomic 
imbalances among the heterogeneous member economies of a “non-optimal currency 
area.” Nor is there any recognition of the ECB’s reluctant but constructive role in sup-
porting GIPS banks after 2008, or any discussion on how ECB monetary policy could, 
in the future, avoid monetary impulses that have the effect of generating imbalances 
among EMU economies.29 In other words, EMU member states cannot expect any help 
from the European level in managing macroeconomic imbalances that are induced by 
European monetary impulses that fail to fit the specific conditions of the national econ-
omy. Instead, member states are expected to deal with potential imbalances through the 
use of their remaining policy instruments − but in doing so, they will be constrained by 
27 In none of the legislative proposals, neither the EDP nor the EIP, is there any suggestion that the 
adoption of “reverse majority” rules might require Treaty amendments. But see: <http://blogs.
telegraph.co.uk/news/danielhannan/100056867/herman-van-rompuy-announces-a-new-re-
verse-majority-rule-to-get-around-the-national-veto>.
28 <www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ecofin/119888.pdf>
29 The omission seems particularly surprising since real interest rates are now lower in Germany 
than in any GIPS economy (Figure 6), and public discussions of recent ECB decisions were 
quite aware of the fact that a rise in interest rates, which would be justified in reference to Ger-
many, might destroy all hopes of recovery in countries such as Spain. 
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the rules of the Excessive Deficit Procedure and they will be controlled by the Commis-
sion’s discretionary interventions under the Excessive Imbalance Procedure. 
These conditions contrast unfavorably with those faced by member states of the former 
European Monetary System. Though politically committed to pegged exchange rates, 
their governments had retained autonomous control over all instruments of macroeco-
nomic policy – which they were able to employ with a view to their own economy, its 
external environment, and their own political priorities and constraints. At the same 
time, however, the governments of these member states remained fully accountable to 
their own constituents for all failures of macroeconomic management. 
But the proposed EMU regime also contrasts to conditions faced by member govern-
ments of a federal nation state with economically heterogeneous regions. These are 
deprived of all instruments of macroeconomic management, and they may also suffer 
from the negative impulses of uniform monetary policies that fail to fit local economic 
conditions. But if a federal government’s monetary policy may be as much part of the 
problem as is the case in the EMU, its fiscal policies will be very much a part of the 
solution. Generally, a central government’s budget is large; its revenues are based on 
taxes that have a major impact on economic activity and its expenditures include those 
programs that are most affected by the rise and decline in economic activity. Hence the 
national budget raises most of its revenue in high-growth regions, and spends most 
of it in depressed regions. Quite apart from any intergovernmental transfer programs, 
therefore, national taxation and national social-policy expenditures will have powerful 
inter-regional equalization effects. Moreover, and perhaps even more importantly, the 
democratic accountability of central government will be as strong if not stronger than 
that of lower-level governments – as will be its motivation to employ its policy instru-
ments with a view to the potential political responses of voters in depressed regions. 
Compared to both of these regimes, member states in a reformed Monetary Union will 
indeed find themselves in the worst of three worlds. Like the provinces or cantons in 
a federal state, they lose control over the instruments of macroeconomic management, 
and are likely to suffer from uniform national policies that do not fit their regional 
economy. At the same time, however, the EU budget is miniscule in comparison to 
the budget of federal states, there are no European taxes and there is no European so-
cial policy to alleviate interregional imbalances. Instead, member states are expected to 
cope with all economic problems by resorting to their own policy resources. In contrast 
to members of the former EMS, however, EMU member states cannot use these policies 
autonomously, but are subject to the intrusive supervision and potential punishment 
imposed by supranational authorities – which are not democratically accountable and 
have no reason to be politically responsive to the citizens affected by their policies. 
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Is there a hidden agenda of EMU reforms?
Assuming that the new regime is installed as planned, its economic success would seem 
to depend on the capacity of the Commission to prevent macroeconomic imbalances 
by issuing precise policy instructions (named “recommendations”) to member-state 
governments. In order to succeed on these terms, moreover, such instructions would 
have to fit the economic conditions and trends in seventeen heterogeneous member 
economies. And they would need to work under the specific conditions and constraints 
of industrial organization, labor-market institutions, administrative capabilities, and 
political structures in each of these countries. Considering the dismal record of eco-
nomic forecasts and the lack of empirically grounded theory representing the complex 
linkages among heterogeneous economic, social and political structures and processes, 
this seems to imply a staggering research agenda. In this light, the Excessive Imbalance 
Procedure might well be seen as an extreme manifestation of the “pretense of knowl-
edge” of which Friedrich August von Hayek, in his Nobel lecture of 1974, accused the 
economic policy makers of the Keynesian era. 
Conceivably, however, what the Commission has in mind is something that is intellec-
tually much less demanding. It should be remembered that EMU-friendly economists 
have always downplayed the fact that the eurozone was not an “optimal currency area” 
(Jonung/Drea 2010). In the words of the ECB’s former Chief Economist, it was suffi-
cient that member economies should respond to asymmetric shocks 
with a high degree of flexibility in the markets for goods and services … This flexibility is needed 
above all in the labor market, that is, wages must adjust to changing market conditions … The 
more the price system (in the widest sense) bears the burden of adjustment, the less important 
is the loss of the national exchange rate and monetary policy instruments, and the greater the 
benefit of using a single currency. (Issing 2009: 48–50)
And moreover: “Conditions such as the necessary market flexibility can also be created 
after entry into monetary union” (ibid.). 
If this should also be the underlying theory of the present EMU reforms,30 it would 
begin to make sense that many of the requirements imposed by the “Memoranda of 
Understanding” for Greece and Ireland appear unlikely to reduce public-sector deficits 
over the short or medium term. Instead, they will impose a wide range of liberalizing 
and market-making “structural reforms” that will weaken union power, privatize public 
services, liberalize the professions and open public health care and education to com-
mercial service providers. 
30 I am not here trying to assess their economic plausibility. But one wonders whether greater mar-
ket flexibility would have prevented the credit financed housing booms in Ireland and Spain (or 
in the USA)? And would union busting and decentralized wage negotiations have allowed better 
responses to the German recession than the economically sophisticated bargaining strategy of 
powerful IG-Metall?
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Obviously, requirements of this type do not have to overcome prohibitive cognitive (em-
pirical and theoretical) difficulties. All they need for guidance are the relatively simple 
rules-of-thumb of supply-side prescriptions that are derived from the abstract models 
of neoclassical micro-economics. From this perspective, then, the intended practice of 
the Excessive Imbalance Procedure would become another instrument for promoting 
market-liberalism in the European Union. This tendency has characterized European 
legislation and decisions from the European Court of Justice since the early 1980s − and 
it is in the process of transforming the “social market economies” of some EU member 
states into “liberal market economies (Jabko 2006; Scharpf 2010). 
But the reach of “hard” European law is still limited, and the Commission’s use of “soft” 
methods in the “Lisbon Process” have not been very successful in promoting “flexibility” 
in areas where EU member states continued to defend their own competences. The 
“Excessive Imbalance Procedure,” however, might now allow the Commission to pursue 
its liberalizing agenda much more widely and effectively. Its “recommendations” merely 
need to be justified by reference to a list of indicators of “economic imbalance” − but 
there is no constraint on the policy changes that may be required. As long as it is alleged 
that they may somehow have an effect on imbalances, the requirements may specify 
policy changes in a completely undefined range of national competences − including 
areas such as labor relations, education or health care that have been explicitly protected 
against European legislation in successive Treaty versions. And to prevent intergovern-
mental bargaining from softening the sanctions against non-complying governments, 
the fines proposed by the Commission would simply be adopted by “reverse qualified-
majority” voting in the Council. So it all seems to fit neatly.
7 Democratic legitimacy in a reformed Monetary Union
Instead of continuing on the slippery slope toward politico-economic conspiracy theo-
ries, I will now return to issues of democratic legitimacy. From the perspective of citi-
zens in Greece, Ireland and Portugal, the European and international agencies imposing 
the “rescue-cum-retrenchment” program are not, themselves, supported by democratic 
legitimacy. What matters, therefore, is the relationship between citizens and the na-
tional governments that are accountable to them. But, as I said in the introduction, ac-
countability has an input-oriented and an output-oriented dimension. 
“Output-oriented legitimacy” reflects popular responses to outcomes that may be attrib-
uted to the policy output of the government whose performance is at issue. Here, a 
first general observation is that you cannot require voters to be fair and that govern-
ments may be punished for outcomes over which they had no control. A second general 
point is that electoral responses reflect relative judgments: Three million unemployed 
in Germany may be a political disaster or a celebrated success depending on the figures 
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of recent years. With that in mind, the “rescue-cum-retrenchment” regime presently 
imposed on GIPS countries can only be considered a disaster of output-oriented le-
gitimacy. Two-digit and still rising rates of unemployment, massive real-wage cuts, and 
rising social inequality will surely not generate outcome satisfaction. Under such condi-
tions, GIPS governments cannot hope to gain political support by appeals to absolute 
or relative measures of economic performance. 
But that does not, by itself, rule out the possibility of input-oriented legitimation. De-
mocracy is, after all, about collective self-determination rather than wish fulfillment. 
It is compatible with the need to respect external constraints, and it may also support 
hard choices and painful sacrifices − provided that these can be justified in public dis-
courses as being effective and normatively appropriate in dealing with common prob-
lems or achieving the collective purposes of the polity (Schmidt 2002, 2006). At the 
same time, however, input-oriented democratic legitimacy does presuppose the pos-
sibility of politically meaningful choices, and it is not at all compatible with a situation 
where choices are pre-empted by external domination (Pettit 1997). 
Margaret Thatcher, for example, was able to gain political support for extremely painful 
retrenchment and structural reforms in Britain after the “Winter of Discontent” of 1979. 
But in comparison to GIPS governments, Thatcher could appeal to traditional British 
values to justify sacrifices that she found to be economically necessary and normatively 
appropriate (Schmidt 2000: 238–242). Moreover, all relevant policy parameters were 
under the control of her (unitary) national government. And most importantly, her 
program was entirely self-chosen, hammered out over several years in intra-party bat-
tles, publicly defended in a successful electoral campaign, and supported by a consider-
able part of public opinion. 
Like Thatcher, the present Greek and Irish governments may, at least for a while, ben-
efit from blaming present hardships on their political predecessors. But they must still 
struggle with the perception that the “understandings” they had to sign in order to ob-
tain the guarantees of the Financial Stability Fund read less like self-chosen programs 
than like protocols of an unconditional surrender. Thus in order to be able to hang on, 
they may desperately need to negotiate for politically visible European “concessions” 
and for permission to adopt at least some “non-liberal” policies to alleviate the worst 
plight of their constituents. If they should fail, and if changes of governments would 
not seem to make a difference, the legitimacy of the democratic regime itself may be in 
danger – especially in polities where democratic government is itself a relatively recent 
achievement.
To a lesser degree, the same problems may also arise in all EMU member states in con-
sequence of measures required and sanctioned by the Excessive Deficit or Imbalance 
Procedures. In some countries, of course, market-liberal discourses may be highly per-
suasive, and governments would have no difficulty in presenting “structural reforms” as 
autonomous and justifiable national policy choices. But where the Commission’s re-
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quirements would violate politically salient interests, preferences and values of national 
constituencies, compliance may again undermine democratic legitimacy. This is not 
meant to suggest that we will soon see more banks burning and blood in the streets of 
Athens, Dublin or Madrid, or of Helsinki and Berlin for that matter. In general, citizens 
in European countries have less to gain and more to lose from open rebellion than has 
been the case in Tunisia, Egypt or Libya. And the most vulnerable victims of retrench-
ment and liberalization policies may lack the capabilities and resources for effective 
political action. 
But political resignation, alienation and cynicism, combined with growing hostility 
against “Frankfurt” and “Brussels,” and a growing perception of zero-sum conflict be-
tween the donors and the recipients of the “rescue-cum-retrenchment” programs, may 
create the conditions for anti-European political mobilization from the extremes of the 
political spectrum. In a worst case scenario, therefore, attempts to save the euro through 
the policies presently enacted may either fail on their own terms, or undermine democ-
racy in EU member states as well as endanger European integration itself. 
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